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Does radio access improve public service provision? 
And if so, does it do so by increasing government 
accountability to citizens, or by persuading households 
to take advantage of publicly-provided services? Prior 
research has argued that citizens with greater access 
to mass media receive greater benefits from targeted 
government welfare programs, but has not addressed 
these questions for public services such as in education 
and health. Using unique data from Benin, this paper 
finds that literacy rates among school children are higher 
in villages exposed to signals from a larger number of 
community radio stations. The effect is identified based 
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Abstract:  Prior research has not examined the effects of citizen access to media on broad public 
services, such as education.  At the same time, research has abstracted from the influential role of 
mass media on parental investments in children‘s education. We address both issues using a ―natural 
experiment‖ in radio access in Benin and find that school children‘s literacy rates are higher in 
villages exposed to a larger number of community radio stations. There is no evidence that this 
effect operates through greater government responsiveness.  Instead, households with greater media 
access make larger private investments in their children‘s education. 
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1.  Introduction 
Strong evidence links mass media access to greater private benefits from government welfare 
programs, such as natural disaster relief in India (Besley and Burgess 2002), and welfare payments 
during the US Great Depression (Strömberg 2004).  Research on mass media and public spending is 
less advanced on two questions. Does media influence extend to outcomes in broad public services, 
such as the quality of public education, or are its effects limited to government transfers?1 If media 
have effects on public service outcomes, do they arise because media facilitate collective action by 
households to make governments more responsive, or because they influence private household 
behavior, such as their take-up of government programs? In education, in particular, parental 
behavior matters for children‘s participation in schools (De Fraja et al, 2010). Does media 
programming influence parental effort and investments in children‘s education?  Specific 
characteristics of the media and education market in Benin allow us to address these questions, some 
for the first time in the literature.2  In particular, we find that greater access to community radio is 
associated with better learning outcomes in village public schools.  Probing the channels for such 
                                                 
1 A substantial literature examines the effects of media on corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; 
Besley and Prat, 2006; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Adsera et al, 2003). Although effects on 
corruption may impact the quality of public services, this research does not specifically examine this. 
We review below work in Uganda that examines the effect of concerted information campaigns, as 
opposed to generalized media access, on corruption in the flow of public funds to schools and on 
school performance (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005).  
2 No prior research, to the best of our knowledge, has empirically examined the influence of media 




association, we find significant evidence of media effects on parental investment in their children‘s 
education, and no evidence of greater government responsiveness.   
The analysis rests on data from a March 2009 survey in Benin of more than 4,000 
households and 210 villages, spread across 32 of the 77 communes in Benin, all located in the 
northern part of the country.  In addition, a literacy test was given to 2,100 children in second grade 
(on average, eight to nine years old) in village schools.  The data collection effort yielded unique 
information on learning among children, school inputs and PTA activities in village public schools, 
and on household education investments.   
Appropriately for the questions we examine here, these villages exhibit substantial variation 
in access to a type of media that emphasizes public interest programming, community radio.  
Differences in village access to community radio are important because villages are the relevant 
jurisdictions within which households are likely to engage in the local action required to improve 
village public schools (for example, through Parent Teacher Associations).  Twenty-one community 
(private, non-commercial) radio stations serve the communes in the sample.  They receive support 
from donors and government precisely to broadcast public interest or educational programming and 
to promote local collective action in poor rural areas.   
Variation in radio access is exogenous, driven by the nature of media markets in northern 
Benin.  Community broadcasters have limited signal strength, so small geographical differences 
between villages are sufficient to yield large differences in access.  Moreover, while these stations 
were established to cater primarily to the commune in which they are based, their signals spill over 
to villages in adjoining communes, leading to substantial variation in access to neighboring 
commune-based radio across villages within the same commune.  Finally, villages within each 




geographic characteristics, rather than the endogenous location of within-commune broadcasters, 
determine intra-commune variation in village access to within-commune radio stations.    
Basic education services in northern Benin are also particularly appropriate to distinguish the 
accountability effects of media influence, since they are almost exclusively provided by the 
government. Only 15 villages out of our sample of 210 report having a functional private school; 
only 1 percent of households report sending their children to a private school. The national 
government‘s budgetary support is critical to fitting these village public schools with the inputs 
needed to deliver quality education. The schools are also required to have Parent Teacher 
Associations (PTAs) to facilitate local agency in improving the quality of education provided. All of 
the schools in our sample report having a PTA.  In principle, therefore, communities have vehicles 
through which they can hold government accountable for its funding and management of public 
schools.   
In the years immediately prior to our survey in March 2009, there were large changes in 
government education policy with increases in public spending on education—specifically, 
abolishing (previously required) tuition payments, and recruiting more teachers (World Bank, 2009). 
In this setting, the effects of radio access on collective action to demand more or better public 
services from government should be evident in more inputs and better quality in schools located in 
villages with greater radio access.  Education also provides a better opportunity than many other 
government services to identify the private behavioral channels through which media access might 
affect public good performance.  Information conveyed by media can influence the extent to which 
households take advantage of public schools.  In contrast, household private behavior has little 
effect on many other measures of public service performance, such as whether a village has a paved 




Based on within-commune variation, the analysis here identifies, for the first time, significant 
effects of media access on outcomes from the government provision of social services:  villages with 
greater access to community radio exhibit greater functional literacy among children in public 
schools.  We are also able to go further than has been possible in past research and probe the 
mechanisms through which greater radio access affects outcomes.  First, we find no evidence that 
the mechanism is through government accountability: schools in villages with greater access to 
community radio exhibit no differences with respect to either these inputs (such as books and 
teachers) or the efficiency with which inputs are utilized (such as lower teacher absenteeism).  
Accountability effects should also manifest themselves in the collective action of villagers.  
However, villages‘ community radio access is uncorrelated with reports of PTA activity. 
Furthermore, household knowledge of recent changes in government education policies is no 
different in villages with greater radio access. 
Instead, second, the evidence supports the proposition that media effects on public services 
operate through changes in parental behavior.  The data allow us to address three questions related 
to parental behavior, none of which previous literature has been able to address, even at the level of 
correlations.  First, does radio access correspond to exposure to more relevant information?  The 
survey of radio programming indicates that community radios broadcast significantly more 
education programs than other commercial and national public stations. We confirm that villages 
with greater access to community radio are exposed to substantially larger numbers of programs on 
education issues. Second, does village access to community radio increase parents‘ own investments 
in children‘s education?  It does:  households living in villages with greater radio access purchase 
more books for their children.  Third, does listening to community radio by households with greater 




listenership of community radio with village access to radio, we find that listening leads households 
to purchase more books and to pay tuition for children‘s education.   
The analysis here therefore contributes to earlier research in three ways.  It documents for 
the first time, using a unique identification strategy, a causal relationship between access to media 
and public service outcomes.  It presents direct evidence on the accountability channel, rejecting the 
proposition that media effects on public services, in this case, operate through greater government 
responsiveness.  And, going beyond previous research, it identifies effects of listening to radio 
programming on parental investments in education.  
While we can confirm that these household-level effects are driven by general exposure to 
greater programming on education issues, we do not have detailed information on programming to 
probe more specific channels of impact (e.g., whether it operates by convincing parents that 
education quality is better than they thought it was; by conveying new information about labor 
market benefits; or simply, by persuading them of the intrinsic value of having better educated 
children). Donors are significant supporters of education programming; correspondence with donor 
officials indicates that the sponsored programs contain a mix of all of these. Investigating the effects 
of specific programming content on household behavior would require an experimental 
methodology that exposes randomly-selected households to different specific programs, while the 
research strategy here takes advantage of an existing natural experiment to evaluate the effects of 
media exposure on its own.  
Donor-supported programming is also supposed to provide greater information on changes 
in government policies and the importance of local action to improve services. Why then, do we 
find no effects on local accountability? The answer lies in the role of political constraints other than 
citizens‘ imperfect information about policies and their effect on ―issue framing‖ in directing the 




constraints, information on policies is, by itself, unlikely to enable citizens to mobilize for local 
accountability. Under these circumstances, community radio programming is more likely to frame 
issues in terms of parental responsibilities towards their children‘s education rather than in terms of 
government responsibility.   
The next section reviews the literature on the role of media and information in government 
accountability, public service delivery, and household behavior. Section 3 summarizes how other 
political constraints in Benin, other than citizens imperfect information, would affect how media 
frames issues to emphasize parental rather than government responsibility and why media access 
would therefore be less likely to influence government responsiveness. Section 4 describes the media 
market in Benin.  Section 5 explains the identification strategy.  The remaining sections present the 
empirical results, beginning with the reduced form finding that greater access leads to higher literacy 
rates, followed by evidence that radio does not encourage collective action to increase government-
provided inputs into local schools, but does shift household behavior towards greater private 
investment in children‘s education.   
2.  Literature Review 
Prior research has investigated the influence on public service provision of targeted and 
randomized information campaigns, with some researchers also asking whether that influence is 
contingent on (endogenous) access to media.  A seminal paper, central to the World Development 
Report 2004, finds that a concerted information campaign in Uganda on leakage in the distribution of 
school grants by district officials led to a dramatic increase in the percent of capitation grants 
received by schools, to more than 80 percent of entitlement from a pre-campaign low of about 20 
percent (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004, 2005).  Björkman (2006) examines the effects of the 
campaign on education quality.  Scores on the Primary Leaving Exam were higher after the 




information delivered by the information campaigns. The analysis here advances this body of 
research by examining both the effects of exogenous media access by itself, independent of 
concerted campaigns, and the mechanisms through which media effects might be transmitted.   
Other research on the role of information from sources other than media has focused on 
intensive grassroots information campaigns, showing mixed effects.  In Banerjee et al. (2010), these 
campaigns alone had no impact on learning in public schools in India, though when combined with 
efforts to organize volunteers to hold remedial classes outside the public school system, gains in 
literacy were large.  Looking at similar information-only campaigns, Pandey et al. (2009) find 
reductions in teacher absenteeism, but little impact on learning outcomes.  In research by Andrabi et 
al. (2008), looking at Pakistan, by far the largest effects of increasing information were on the 
behavior of private schools, which faced the risk of parents switching to better-performing schools. 
In contrast, in Uganda an intensive campaign to mobilize communities to improve public health 
services, in which project representatives not only provided information, but also actively promoted 
the organization of villagers, led to large improvements in services provided and in health outcomes 
(Björkman and Svensson, 2009).  The analysis here focuses instead on media access in the absence 
of concerted and intensive information or mobilization interventions and examines household 
responses to radio access. 
A separate stream of the literature examines redistributive policies:  citizens with more media 
access are more likely to be recipients of targeted benefits from government programs (Besley and 
Burgess 2002, Strömberg 2004). Scholars offer an accountability explanation for this result:  citizens 
with greater access to media are better able to punish governments for failure to deliver benefits.  
However, data limitations, particularly the absence of evidence from household surveys, have made 
it difficult to distinguish this mechanism from others, such as the behavioral channels that we 




Prat and Strömberg (2005) use household surveys in Sweden undertaken during a period in 
which commercial television broadcasts reached progressively more areas of the country.  New 
recipients of the broadcasts not only participated more in elections but also had more political and 
policy knowledge.  Data limitations do not allow them to assess effects on public policies, however.3  
Snyder and Strömberg (forthcoming) shed light on effects on both knowledge and government 
effort by exploiting the incomplete correspondence between electoral districts and newspaper 
markets in the United States.  Where the correspondence is low, the incentives of newspapers to 
report on legislator actions are attenuated, voters know less about their legislators and the legislators 
appear to work less diligently on behalf of their districts.  Districts with low correspondence receive 
less federal funding, on average.  The analysis here contributes to this work by looking at outcomes 
of public services rather than the distribution of welfare benefits and program funding; at media 
content; and at both behavioral and accountability channels of media effects. 
Keefer and Khemani (2011) examine the effects of community radio access in northern 
Benin on the household acquisition of government bed nets and find that media access increases the 
number of bed nets that households report having purchased (as opposed to received for free), just 
as it increases household investments in education.  Two significant differences distinguish that 
work from this analysis.  First, while bed net distribution is a social service, it is more closely related 
to the monetary transfers that have been previously analyzed in the literature, with a significantly less 
complex production function than the provision of student learning.  Second, the bed net analysis 
focuses on the effect of media access on the pricing strategies of government officials:  while 
                                                 
3 There is a large literature, not directly relevant for our work in Benin, on the influence of political 
news and campaign advertisements in the US on political behavior—on voting and party affiliation 




previous work on bed net utilization focuses on price and information effects separately, Keefer and 
Khemani (2011) find that where information increases the demand for bed nets, local officials 
responsible for distribution are more likely to charge for the nets than to give them away for free.   
A large communications literature shows that focused media programming can influence 
household behavior in public health and family planning, and in women‘s empowerment, though 
these studies do not control for the endogeneity of radio access (Arnold and Lambino 2009 provide 
a review).  Other work addresses this endogeneity, but does not examine effects on government 
programs, as in the analysis here.  For example, Chong and La Ferrara (2009) find that expanding 
access to the broadcasts of soap operas in Brazil led to increased rates of divorce and separation; La 
Ferrara, et al. (2008) report that it reduced fertility.  The potential adverse influence of radio access 
on household behavior, with tragic consequences, was recently quantified in Yanagizawa‘s (2009) 
work on the impact of ―hate radio‖ in the Rwandan genocide.   
An aspect of both behavior and accountability is the participation of citizens in collective 
organizations.  Olken (2009) argues that the spread of television in Indonesia may have crowded out 
participation in groups:  greater television viewing leading to lower engagement in social associations 
and reduced perceptions of trust.   However, he finds no effect of television access on local village 
governance and policies:  the number of meetings and corruption in village road projects are 
unaffected by television viewing.  Our analysis is the first that looks both at behavioral effects on 
access to public services and on participation in collective action.  Like much research in this area, 
Strömberg (2004), Olken (2009), and Yanagizawa (2009) use geologic features that obstruct radio 
broadcasts as instruments for radio access, arguing that these features (such as remoteness or the 
suitability of land for economic activity) do not have independent effects on the outcomes of 




Benin to argue that variation in radio access across villages within the same commune is accidental, 
and exogenous to village characteristics.   
The analysis here also contributes to better understanding of community radios.  These have 
been a particular focus of donors, but with little evidence on their efficacy.  Proponents have argued 
that community radio is specifically designed to impact local collective action.  Community radios 
are, by definition, licensed as non-commercial radio organized to serve the public interest of the 
communities in which they are based (Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada, 2002; Buckley, et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, in the Africa region in particular, community radio networks are used by governments 
and international donors to convey general public-interest information on the value of health and 
education to remote, rural and poor areas, such as northern Benin (Buckley et al, 2008). However, 
the effects of community radio have not been rigorously tested.  The estimations below provide 
such a test and identify positive effects on education.  
3.  When and how does media access matter?  Theory and predictions 
Though much of the research reviewed above points to the accountability effects of 
information and media, there are at least three reasons why media effects on government 
accountability might be weaker for public goods than for targeted transfers.  First, public good 
failure is less newsworthy than disaster.  Reports of natural or economic disasters are more 
intrinsically interesting to readers and sell more newspapers than do articles on the chronic failures 
in public good provision, such as dilapidated school buildings and absent teachers (Drèze and Sen, 
1990; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007; Khemani, 2007).  To the extent that public good failure is not 
reported in the media, media access should have less effect on the provision of public goods.  Our 
analysis is not affected by this caveat because we have, unlike earlier research, direct evidence that a 
significant share of the programming of the media examined here is dedicated to health and 




informing households about the importance of investing in education and the share that informs 
households about the political and bureaucratic decisions responsible for the quality of education 
provision).   
This relates to a second reason why media access may not have accountability effects.  
Policies differ according to the ease with which political responsibility for outcomes can be 
identified.  In more complex areas of public policy, where it is more difficult to attribute 
responsibility for outcomes, citizens are less likely to get the information from media that they need 
to hold governments responsible for poor outcomes.  For these types of public policies, media 
access alone is unlikely to have strong effects on citizen ability to hold governments accountable.   
In Benin, as elsewhere, national legislators, local officials of the education ministry, 
principals, teachers, parents, and students themselves all share responsibility for student learning.  
The information citizens need to determine government responsibility for school quality is greater 
and more nuanced than the information they need to affix responsibility for failures in government 
transfer programs (or the bed net distribution programs analyzed in Keefer and Khemani 2011).  At 
the same time, since education broadcasts on media are largely funded by donors and government 
ministries, they are likely to focus most on household benefits from investing in education, and on 
conveying de jure government policies, rather than de facto assessments of performance in translating 
policies into outcomes.  Based on the likely information content of education broadcasts, and the 
way education issues are framed, it is less likely that media access in Benin increases government 
accountability for the delivery of education services.   
Third, even if media broadcast information on public services, attributes of political systems 
other than citizen information may obstruct the ability of informed citizens to demand better 
performance from governments.  Though the literature on media and information typically abstracts 




substantial (Keefer and Khemani 2005).  Societies may be socially polarized or political competition 
rooted in clientelist promises of privately targeted and immediate benefits even in settings where 
citizens are well-informed (Khemani 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). Ferejohn (1986), for example, 
demonstrated that when politicians cannot make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters, 
voters cannot act collectively to expel incumbents and political shirking increases.  Persson and 
Tabellini (2000) specifically predict that lack of political credibility suppresses public good provision.  
Keefer (2007) argues that the relative inability of political competitors in younger democracies to 
make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters explains why, compared to older democracies, 
public goods are more scarce in younger democracies and targeted policies and corruption more 
prevalent.  If even informed citizens confront insuperable obstacles to collective action aimed at 
holding governments accountable, media access would have a smaller effect on public good 
provision than otherwise.   
The political setting in Benin is precisely one in which the capacity of citizens to act 
collectively to sanction non-performing incumbents is weak.  Credible political commitments are, in 
developed democracies, mediated by political parties.  In Benin, these parties are absent.  Since 
competitive elections were first held in 1991, the number of parties has fluctuated between 129 and 
27, rising to over 100 prior to the 2007 elections (Economist Intelligence Unit).  None of the four 
parties emerging from the 2007 elections had a programmatic identity – a basis for making credible 
commitments to groups of citizens.  Party fractionalization is high:  in 2006 the probability that two 
randomly selected legislators do not belong to the same party was 80 percent in Benin, compared to 
52 percent in Ghana (Beck, et al. 2001).  The political setting in Benin may therefore reduce the 
effects of media access on citizen ability to hold government accountable for service delivery.   
However, even if media access does not have a large effect on government accountability, it 




of government benefits.  Here again, though, increased take-up should occur only under specific 
conditions:  radio stations must broadcast the relevant information and households must listen to 
the broadcasts.  Absent a market for information – whether on government accountability or on the 
existence and benefits of a particular policy – the impact of media on either government 
accountability or citizen take-up of policy benefits is likely to be negligible.  Public interest 
programming that might convey information about the benefits of schooling or particular health 
practices may not be the type of programming to which listening audiences flock nor (for that very 
reason) interesting for radio stations to broadcast.  These limitations are not present in northern 
Benin, as we describe in the following section:  survey results indicate that households in northern 
Benin prefer listening to community radio more than the ubiquitous national public radio.   
In short, in countries in which collective political action by citizens confronts many 
obstacles, we hypothesize that media access alone has a limited effect on political incentives to 
improve public policies.  This means, in contrast to the hypothesis advanced by proponents of 
community radio, that community radio may not promote local collective action to improve 
government responsiveness (Buckley, et al. 2008). However, where media broadcast and citizens 
listen to programs that provide information on the benefits of public policies, media access could 
have a strong effect on household incentives to take advantage of those policies.  
4.  Media access in northern Benin 
In a literature dominated by a focus on monolithic countries (India, Brazil and Indonesia), 
and where even Uganda has a population of nearly 30 million, Benin stands out as a small country in 
Francophone West Africa with a land area of approximately 110,000 square kilometers (slightly 
smaller than the state of Pennsylvania) and a population of about 8,400,000.  However, it has several 
advantages for the study of media effects.  By the standards of the region, it has a relatively long (20 




setting in which to examine competing hypotheses on whether media effects operate through 
accountability channels.4  It is also known for its vibrant network of local radio media.  According to 
ratings of Reporters Without Borders from 2009, the year of our survey, Benin ranks 72
nd in the world, 
out of 175, in terms of freedom of the press, just behind Brazil (number 71), Botswana, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Liberia and Togo, but substantially ahead of most other African countries.   
Benin has 77 communes, ranging in population from under 40,000 to over 700,000.  Income 
per capita is approximately ten times greater in the richest compared to the poorest commune.  The 
77 communes serve as the electoral districts from which 83 members of the national assembly are 
elected through a system of party-list proportional representation. It is also the lowest tier of 
government, with each commune government consisting of a council of directly elected members 
who elect a mayor from among their ranks.  
Given the importance of commune characteristics in the location of radio stations, our 
sampling strategy focused on 32 northern communes of Benin where we had reason to believe there 
would be substantial within-commune variation in radio access across villages that is exogenous to 
village-specific characteristics.  A map of our study area is provided in Appendix 1. In the more 
urbanized and densely settled southern region of the country, most areas have access to multiple 
national and commercial radio stations resulting in little within-commune variation.5   
                                                 
4 Although, for the reasons discussed in Section 3, we hypothesize that accountability effects may 
not be sufficiently strong for public services because young democracies exhibit political market 
failures that have perhaps been insufficiently appreciated in prior literature on media and 
accountability. 
5 Only the northern commune of Parakou is excluded from our study; it is the second largest city of 




During March and April 2009 we collected ownership, licensing, programming and other 
details on all 68 radio stations operating in Benin; we used direct observations by enumerators and 
interviews with key informants to assess the availability and quality of public goods in 210 villages 
across the 32 northern communes; and we implemented a survey of the service access, policy 
knowledge, and political attitudes of 4200 households residing in these villages, randomly selecting 
20 households from each village. Radio access was determined in two ways.  Village-level key 
informants listed which radio stations they were able to receive, and the enumerators used their own 
transistors to verify and expand on this, if they received additional signals. The codes of the radio 
listed as accessible to the village were then matched with the radio survey data to examine the nature 
of programming available to the village. Table 1 summarizes the number and types of radio stations 
covering this study area.  
 
















(over the past 
3 mths) 
Government-owned Public 
Radio  3  200  2667 watts  33 
Private Non-commercial or 
Community Radio  21  195  231 watts  50.6 
Private Commercial Radio  10  49  476 watts  21 
Religious Radio  2  71  .  . 
 
In addition to the ubiquitous national public radio, this region of Benin is primarily covered 
by a number of local community radio stations. These stations are non-commercial in part by 




consequence, they support themselves by selling airtime to donors and government ministries.  
These seek to provide information to households that will encourage them to improve their 
decisions regarding health and education.  Of the 21 community radio stations to which our village 
sample has access, 14 are dependent upon funds from foreign donors, and 3 on non-governmental 
organizations. All of the community radio stations list the provision of information on health and 
education as ―very important‖ to their objectives.  The average number of education programs 
reported by station managers is almost double for community radio compared to public radio, and 
almost three times that of private commercial radio. Hence, access to more numbers of community 
radio is likely to be associated with exposure to more programming on the value of health and 
education services. 
European donors across several African countries funded community radio to consolidate 
democratic transitions in these countries and to provide public-interest programming to remote and 
rural areas that would promote local development initiatives (Gratz, 1999). Donor officials claim 
that sponsored education programming contains a mix of themes, related to both the value of 
education and government policies. For example, the USAID Team Leader for Education and Basic 
Services writes that education messages in radio programming supported by USAID are intended to 
―reinforce the value of basic education and the important role of teachers.‖  Some programming, 
aimed at teachers, emphasizes that ―good classroom teaching and professional behavior are 
appreciated and will be rewarded in the upcoming merit awards program.‖6  Such programming 
contains information about teacher policies and the importance of teacher performance, which is 
relevant for local action to improve village public schools. At the same time, the general message of 
                                                 




the value of education and policy efforts to increase quality can influence parental assessment of the 
importance of sending children to school and investing in education.   
Community radio stations have low signal strength and any one station is accessible to only a 
few villages in our sample.  Yet, because of the large number of community broadcasters, at least 
one community signal is accessible to 93 percent of our sampled villages. In contrast, while private 
commercial radio has greater signal strength, these are established in the southern communes of 
Benin, outside our study area; only a few villages in our sample (23 percent) are able to access their 
signals. Government-owned public radio has several relay transmitters allowing it to cover most of 
the villages in our sample (95 percent) with uniform programming. We were not able to gather 
reliable data on the nature of programming on religious radio, but our household data suggests that 
almost no one listens to it. 
Most households that listen to radio report listening either to the national public radio or to 
a local community radio, or both.  Of the 3828 households that listen to some radio, 64 percent 
report listening to at least one community radio station and 45 percent report listening to national 
public radio.7 Only 13 households report listening to religious radio and only 176 to private 
commercial radio.8 These listening preferences reflect what broadcast media experts have 
contended:  poor households in rural Africa prefer to listen to local radio stations because their 
                                                 
7 ―Listenership‖ data was gathered by simply asking households to name the station they listen to 
and then having our investigating team post-code the response for type of radio. We did not directly 
prompt the household to categorize what type of radio they like listening to.  
8 Even among these 176 that report listening to some private commercial radio, only 67 report 
listening only to commercial radio; the rest listen as well to at least one other public or community 




programming conforms better to their tastes and linguistic preferences than do broadcasts from 
radios headquartered outside of their region (Buckley et al, 2008). 
Much of the literature on media access must concern itself with the multiple sources of 
information that households have.  In Benin, radio is essentially the only media to which most 
citizens have access.  According to the nationally representative Afrobarometer (2005) survey of 
Benin, 25 percent of households own televisions.  In our sample of 4200 households from northern 
Benin, only eight percent own a television, but 84 percent own radios.  Newspapers are under-
developed in Benin; the largest has a circulation of 7,000.  They have little or no penetration in the 
areas surveyed here, although interviews with radio station staff indicate that radio news reports 
about Benin are often prepared based on reports from newspapers in the capital city, Cotonou.  
5.  Identification—the “natural experiment” in north Benin 
The central challenge in identifying media effects is the possibility that unobserved factors 
influence both media access and outcomes of interest, such as the provision of education services.  
The fragmentation of the radio market in Benin present circumstances akin to a natural experiment, 
giving us a different strategy to control for the endogenous placement of radio stations than in the 
received literature.  
Previous research has relied on geological features that obstruct broadcasts from one or a 
few large stations as the source of identification of media impact (Strömberg, 2004; Olken, 2009; 
and Yanagizawa, 2009). Most debate centers on the exclusion assumption that these features have 
no direct effect on outcomes of interest.  To the extent that topographical differences between 
communities with more and less access are significant, the exclusion assumption is more 
controversial.  For example, geological obstacles that leave communities with less radio access might 
also render them significantly more isolated in all respects compared to communities with more 




external validity are also more pronounced, since the effects of media access on remote jurisdictions 
may not be the same as in more general populations.   
The idiosyncrasies of the radio market in Benin allow us to rely on small geological features 
to identify radio effects; it is implausible that these features influence education outcomes except 
through their effects on radio access.  Radio markets in northern Benin consist of many small radio 
stations with limited signal strength, each carrying similar programming that is likely to influence 
education decisions.  Villages that are close to each other and not separated by any remarkable 
topographical features can nevertheless exhibit significant differences in access because short 
distances and small changes in elevation are enough to degrade the signal received by some of them. 
As Table 1 illustrates, although 93 percent of the sampled villages can access signals from at 
least one local community radio, variation in the number of community radios to which they have 
access is large, ranging from zero to seven stations.  The average number is 2.4; the standard 
deviation is 1.5.  Exposure to a greater number of signals is expected to be correlated with greater 
exposure to programming on the value of education, as discussed in the previous section and as will 
be confirmed in the following section on empirical results. In contrast, villages are homogeneous in 
their access to the relayers of the national public radio station:  all but 20 villages in the sample 
receive strong signals from one or more relays.  
One might nevertheless be concerned that the location of small radio stations is related to 
unobserved characteristics of the villages that receive them.  This is allayed by the histories of 
individual radio stations, our purposive selection of the village sample, and controls for commune 
fixed effects.  As discussed in the previous section, most of the small community radio stations were 
established through the support of donors and governments, who cared about reaching remote and 




By themselves, these selection criteria are ideal for our purposes.  However, donors needed 
local partners to establish the stations and idiosyncratic conditions within communes affected which 
communes yielded such partners.  Ahokpossi (2009) argues that potential radio entrants in Benin 
took the commune as the relevant market and took commune-specific characteristics into account in 
deciding whether they would locate.  Commune-specific characteristics, related to economic 
conditions and political struggles within a commune, therefore ultimately affected where radios were 
established   
For example, in a detailed case study of one of these community radios, Radio Tanguieta 
located in Tanguieta commune in Atacora department, Gratz (1999) reports on the political 
contestation over the locally-elected committee to oversee the radio and manage its funds. Control 
of the community radio rested in the hands of local politicians and Gratz indicates concerns about 
embezzlement and over-spending on salaries of numerous presenters representing different ethnic 
groups.  Community radio projects are subject, then, to the same political risks of local elite capture 
and clientelist and ethnic politics as community-based projects in other sectors.   
Since the unobserved characteristics of communes that affect these projects could plausibly 
affect education outcomes, we do not exploit inter-commune differences in community radio access 
to identify radio effects on education outcomes.  Instead, all estimates control for commune fixed 
effects and identify the influence of community radio on education outcomes based solely on intra-
commune variation in radio access. 
Even within a commune, however, villages with access to more within-commune 
community radio broadcasters may have unobserved economic and cultural characteristics that 
promote better education outcomes. We constructed our sample of villages to be able to address 
such concerns. The 210 villages in the study were selected from maps showing the location of 




approximately equidistant to (equally remote from) radio towers and roads inside the commune.9 
Complementing the fragmentation of the Benin radio market, such a sampling frame yields variation 
in radio access driven by station location and transmission conditions that are exogenous to the 
sampled villages.  
Most of the variation in access to radio signals is explained by differences in access to out-
of-commune radio stations.  The average household has access to .63 private within-commune 
community radio stations, with a standard deviation of .51.   It has access to 1.78 out-of-commune 
stations, with a standard deviation of 1.45.  Exposure to signals from neighboring communes is 
particularly likely to be exogenous, since the location decisions of out-of-commune community 
broadcasters are unrelated to the characteristics of villages in neighboring communes.   
Examination of observable village characteristics reinforces the conclusion that within-
commune variation in radio access is exogenous to village characteristics.  If observable 
characteristics do not differ systematically across villages with more and less access to community 
radio, it is unlikely that radio access would be associated with unobservable characteristics that have 
independent effects on education. The village survey includes data on village distance from urban 
centers and distance to a train or bus stop; smaller and more remote villages could both be likely to 
have fewer accessible radio signals and lower investments in education.  Larger villages might also 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately, no data was available on the precise GPS locations of stations and villages to 
directly control for this in our analysis. The best we could do was rely on pictorial maps provided by 
our local consultants to ―eyeball‖ neighboring villages that were located equally distant from radio 
towers. However, as we discuss below, we are able to verify that our sampled villages exhibit no 
correlation between radio access and observable characteristics of location that could independently 




have more access to radio signals and to government education services:  the most recent census in 
Benin, from 2002, has information on village population for nearly all of the villages in the sample.   
Poorer villages might have unobserved characteristics that affect both radio access and 
education outcomes.  Though there is no census or statistically representative data of incomes and 
economic conditions at the village-level in Benin, the surveys offer several proxies for village 
incomes.  Most are based on village averages of responses to the household survey:  the percentage 
of households that report their income as belonging to the lowest of the income brackets; the 
percentages of sampled households that report owning a mobile phone and a television; the 
percentage of households surveyed with brick walls; and the percentage with houses with more than 
five rooms.  With 20 observations per village, these averages are not precise enough to reject small 
income differences across villages, but they are sufficient to test whether larger income differences 
separate villages with more and less radio access.  From the village surveys, it is also possible to 
compare villages according to the number of private schools serving the village.   
Finally, village linguistic characteristics could be associated both with their inclusion into 
specific radio markets and independently with cultural practices that influence education. Based on 
the household survey, it is possible to compare villages according to, first, the probability that any 
two of these households would speak the same language at home; and, second, an indicator variable 
for whether the most common language among the sample of 20 households in a village is different 
from the most common language among all the households surveyed in the commune in which that 
village resides.  
Table 2 reports results from a multivariate regression that yields no statistically significant 
association between any of these variables and either the number of community radio stations  or 
the share of community stations as a fraction of all stations to which a village has access.  No 




the variable closest to significance is the distance of a village from the nearest urban center.  
However, its effects are small:  a one standard deviation increase in distance (18.7 kilometers) is 
associated with access to approximately 0.11 fewer radio stations.   




Table 2:  Correlates of village access to community radio 
(Commune fixed effects, robust p-values in parentheses) 
 
  Number of Community 
Radios 
Share of Community 
Radios 
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Probability that main language in any two 











Mean number of houses in village with more 











Observations  200  200 
R
2  0.78  0.69 
 
In villages with a larger share of community radios, brick walls are almost significantly more 
common.  Again, the magnitude of the effect is small:  a one standard deviation in the fraction of 
households with brick walls (19 percent) is associated with only a three percent greater share of 




village-level variation in community radio access is largely explained by commune fixed-effects 
alone, rather than the inclusion of these additional variables; the R
2 for the fixed effects 
specification, without any additional controls, is 0.73. 
Table 3:  Bivariate correlates of village access to community radio 
(Bivariate regressions; commune fixed effects; robust p-values in parentheses) 
 
  Coefficients from bivariate 
regression (p-value) 
Village population (1,000s)  .05  (.29) 
Paved road  .33  (.26) 
Potable water source  -.01  (.74) 
Village chief has some primary or secondary 
education 
.23  (.15) 
Distance of village to nearest urban center  -.01  (.09) 
75% of villages < 32 km from nearest urban 
center 
-.001  (.91) 
Distance of village to nearest bus or train stop  -.01  (.25) 
Fraction of surveyed households with income < 
30,000 CFA Francs 
-.57  (.10) 
75% of villages where this fraction is < .53  -.81  (.30) 
Fraction of surveyed households in dwelling with   
brick walls  .58  (.25) 
cement floors  -.11  (.81) 
more than 5 rooms  -.18  (.78) 
Most common language in village and commune is 
the same 
.25  (.31) 
Probability that main language in any two households 
in the village is the same 
-.31  (.57) 
 
Table 3 provides bivariate correlations between radio access and each of the variables 
included in the regression of Table 2. In nearly all cases, observable village characteristics are not 
significantly correlated with community radio access. However, in this bivariate setting there appears 




coefficient is not large:  a one standard deviation increase in distance (18.7 kilometers) is associated 
with access to .19 fewer stations (less than .20 of a standard deviation).  If one looks only at the 75 
percent of villages that are no more than 32 kilometers from the nearest urban center, however, 
there is no significant association between radio access and distance.  The results reported below are 
robust to looking only at this smaller sample of villages. 
The fraction of households reporting incomes of less than 30,000 CFA Francs is also 
marginally correlated with community radio access.  A one standard deviation increase in this 
fraction (.21) is associated with access to .12 fewer community radio stations, less than 10 percent of 
the standard deviation of community radio access.  This association is not significant in the 75 
percent of villages where fewer than 53 percent of villages report low incomes.  Again, results below 
are robust to looking only at this subsample.   
In sum, the fragmentation of the Benin radio market and a sampling procedure that exploits 
variation in access to out-of-commune community radio stations allow us to include more 
homogeneous villages than has been possible in previous research and to identify variation in radio 
access with less significant geographic features.  Unobserved differences between commune villages 
that can access community radio broadcasts, particularly from outside of the commune, and those 
that cannot, are likely to be insignificant compared to the differences between villages that can 
access centrally-broadcast media and those that cannot.   
6.  Village-level variation in radio access and education outcomes 
The essential ―outcome‖ measure in education is whether students are learning, or acquiring 
specific competencies. To build such a measure, we applied a new type of literacy test developed by 
Pratham, a large civic society organization in India (ASER).  The test assesses whether students can 
read words, sentences and simple paragraphs in French.  It is easy and reliable to administer and 




used successfully in East Africa to measure basic reading competencies among young school-age 
children (UWEZO).  The test was applied to ten children in the second grade in each village, 2100 
children in all.  The average age of the tested children was 8.75 years.10   
Measured literacy rates vary widely among the 210 village public schools.  Nineteen percent 
of all tested children, across all villages, could read simple sentences and paragraphs in French. In 
the median village, only 10 percent of tested children could read at this level. In 67 villages, or 32 
percent of the sample, none of the tested children was able to read at this level while in 12 percent 
of the sample, 26 villages, more than half the children could.   
The central hypothesis in this paper is that a key public service in villages in northern Benin 
– the quality of education in the village public school – is influenced by village access to community 
radio.  To test the hypothesis, we estimate  
(1)                                                                              
where j indexes the 210 villages and k the 32 communes,    is a commune fixed effect, and X is a 
vector of village controls.  The key coefficient is    which, because of exogenous variation within 
communes in the number of community radios to which villages have access, is identified through 
the inclusion of commune fixed effects. The dependent variable is the proportion of children tested 
in the village public school who could read sentences and paragraphs. 
All of the variables in Table 2 are controls in X.  In addition, X includes the availability of 
other public goods (literacy centers, health centers, the availability of a secondary school) and 
whether the village is one of the few with a functioning private school.  The effects of access to 
community radios depend on the village‘s access to other types of radio, as well.  A highly popular 
                                                 
10 We did not administer the literacy test in our household survey because we did not have a reliable 




commercial radio might attenuate village interest in community radio, for example.  The control 
variables therefore also include the number of religious, public and commercial radio stations to 
which villages have access.   
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (1) with different sets of controls.  Since 
the effects of access to community radio might operate through other right hand-side variables, such 
as the presence of other public goods that might increase demand for education, the first column 
shows the simple bivariate correlation between access to radios and child literacy.  Villages within 
communes with access to a larger number of community radio stations have a higher share of 
children that are literate (each additional community radio station increases the share of literate 
children by 3.6 percentage points).  The second column includes all of the controls except for the 
number of other types of radios to which villages have access.  The estimated effect of additional 
community radio stations rises to five percentage points.  The third column adds controls for other 
radio stations and the estimated effect rises further, to 5.4 percent.  A one standard deviation 
increase in community radio access (by 1.5 stations) increases literacy by 8 percentage points, or .40 
of a standard deviation.   
Few of the control variables are significant after controlling for commune fixed effects.  
Villages that are closer to the nearest urban center exhibit higher rates of child literacy.  A one 
standard deviation increase in distance to the nearest urban center reduces the share of literate 
children by approximately three percentage points.  Villages with more educated chiefs (those with 
secondary education) exhibit less literacy than villages with no or only pre-school education.  In 85 
percent of the villages, the main language spoken by sampled households is the same as the main 
language spoken by all the households surveyed in the commune.  In these villages, the share of 
literate children is approximately eight percentage points greater.  The number of non-community 
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stations received by 
village  
    0.0147 
(0.67) 
       
Religious radio 
stations received by 
village  
    -0.0553 
(0.35) 
       
Public radio stations 
received by village 
    0.0642 
(0.25) 
       
Observations  210  199  199  152  151  199  199 
R
2  0.30  0.40  0.42  0.44  0.44  0.41  0.43 
Note:  All specifications include commune fixed effects, and have standard errors clustered by commune; p-values are 
reported in parentheses.  Other control variables (none significant), not reported:  village population; whether village has 
a paved road; dummy for presence of secondary school; number of functional private schools; health or maternity center 
dummy; number of potable water sources built in 2007 or 2008; whether village chief has primary schooling; distance of 
village to nearest bus or train stop; fraction of households in village sample with income less than 30,000 CFA Francs; 
mean number of houses in village sample with brick walls; mean number of homes in village sample with cement floors; 
mean number of houses in village sample with more than five rooms; fraction of households in village sample with a 




The fourth and fifth columns of Table 4 provide further support for the argument that 
unobserved village characteristics do not drive the results in the first three columns .  Column four 
reports estimates on a subsample that excludes the 25 percent of villages (47) located further than 32 
kilometers from an urban center.  Results are unchanged; the effects of community radio increase, 
such that additional stations increase the share of literate children by six percentage points.  Column 
5 excludes the 25 percent of the sample villages in which more than 53 percent of households 
reported income of less than 30,000 CFA Francs.  Effects of community radio access are 
unchanged.   
The sixth column separately examines the effects of within-commune variation in village 
access to within- and out-of-commune community radio stations.  The coefficient for out-of-
commune stations is similar to the aggregate coefficient in the earlier estimates:  one additional out-
of-commune community radio station is associated with a 4.8 percentage point increase in the 
literacy share.  The coefficient for within-commune stations is larger, suggesting that own-commune 
stations are likely to have a larger influence on household behaviors and education outcomes. The 
seventh column applies an atheoretical robustness test, using robust regressions to arbitrarily reduce 
the weight given to influential observations.  The weight given to those observations is the Stata 
default (tune = 7).   The effects of community radio remain significant, though the coefficient value 
drops to .026.   
7.  Channels of influence of village radio access on education outcomes 
The data allow us to test, for the first time, the mechanisms through which radio access 
exerts effects on public policy – in this case, literacy.  One basic issue in examining mechanisms is 
whether community radio access is actually associated with increased village exposure to education-
related information.  Like other studies, this analysis measures media access with the number of 




permit us to verify that this measure is associated with exposure to more relevant information.  
Table 5 shows that villages with greater access to community radio are also exposed to more 
education and health programming.11  The coefficient on the total number of radio stations 
indicates the average health and education programming that is associated with an extra radio 
station.  From the first and second columns, each additional radio station is associated with 
approximately 19 additional education programs and three additional health programs.  Additional 
community radios are associated with 20 education programs, in addition to the 19, and 126 health 
programs.   
The third and fourth columns disaggregate radio types, distinguishing the contribution of 
community, public, commercial and religious radio stations to health and education programming.  
Community radios make, by far, the largest contribution to such programming.  Religious stations 
are more likely to broadcast education programming, a mix of both secular and sectarian shows; they 
are significantly less likely to broadcast health programs.  Public and commercial radios, with less 
need to raise funds by selling air-time to donors or government ministries, contribute relatively little 
education and health programming.  The final two columns distinguish the health and education 
offerings of community radios broadcasting from inside and outside the village‘s commune.  Villages 
that receive (exogenously) more out-of-commune community radio stations are also exposed to 
significantly more health and education programming.   
                                                 
11 The dependent variable here is the number of education programs that the radio manager reports 





Table 5:  Community Radio Effects on Village Exposure to Education and Health Programs 
(Commune fixed effects, robust p-values in parentheses) 
  Number of Programs: 
  Education  Health  Education  Health  Education  Health 
             
Community radio received by 









   
Within-commune community 
radio received by village (# 
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radio received by village (# 
stations) 














Public radio received by village 
(# stations) 




   
Commercial radio received by 
village (# stations) 




   
Religious radio received by 
village (# stations) 




   
Observations  210  210  210  210  210  210 
R
2  0.90  0.80  0.91  0.81  0.91  0.80 
Note:  Standard errors clustered at commune level. Each column regresses the number of education or health programs 
received by a village, as determined by information supplied by the radios that broadcast to the village, on the number of 
different types of radio stations received by the village.  The regressions control for commune fixed effects and therefore 
capture only intra-communal variation in village access to education and health programming.   
 
The second issue in discussing mechanisms of radio effects is whether this information 
influences literacy outcomes through accountability or behavioral channels.  If through 
accountability, then villages with greater access should see greater government provision of those 
inputs that matter for child literacy and more evidence of collective action.  For every village school, 
enumerators collected information on the following:  the average pupil-teacher ratio across 




are absent on the day of the visit, the number of classrooms, and the share of classrooms where the 
survey team could see teaching activity.  In addition, the household survey asks respondents to give 
their assessment of how active the Parent-Teacher Association is.  Although all schools report 
having a PTA, households vary significantly in the degree to which they report PTA activities aimed 
at improving schools.  Since community action to secure greater school inputs would likely occur 
through the PTA, this is a plausible proxy for collective action.   
To see if these inputs were significantly higher in villages with greater access to community 
radio, we estimate the following, 
                                                                                        , 
where the control variables are the same as in the base specification (column 2) of Table 3.  Table 6 
displays the main results of the estimation.  Community radio access has no effect on any inputs.  
Tangible inputs into education (teachers, classrooms and books) are no different across villages with 
less or more access.  Government oversight of the deployment of those resources, measured by 
teacher absenteeism, is also no different.  Access seems to have no effect on collective action:  
perceived levels of PTA activity are unrelated to access to community radio.  The PTA result does 
not change when using an estimate of PTA activity based only on the perceptions of households 
with children in school. In addition, there is no correlation between village radio access and the 
proportion of households reporting specific PTA participation in the recruitment of new teachers, 
monitoring of teacher presence in the classroom, conflict resolution, school supervision, or the 
collection of contributions.12  These results stand in contrast to earlier research on transfer 
programs, where access to media did affect government behavior.   
 
                                                 





















































Observations  196  196  199  195  198  199 
R
2  0.59  0.32  0.43  0.37  0.47  0.51 
Note:  Commune-clustered  p-values in parentheses.  Regressions control for commune fixed effects.  Control variables 
are the same as in the base specification (column 2) of Table 3.  With isolated exceptions, none are significant.  Only 
village population and community radio stations are reported here.   
 
In fact, in Table 6, no determinants of school inputs seem to matter, consistent with the 
government‘s claim to allocate resources on a strict per capita basis, or with the possibility that 
allocation is purely random.  The only correlate that is significant in even two of the specifications is 
village population.  Both significant results, however, are intuitive:  larger villages with larger student 
populations have higher student-teacher ratios (classroom size is approximately two pupils larger).  
On the other hand, they are also more attractive to teachers:  teacher absenteeism is somewhat lower 
in larger villages. 
A further test of the accountability channel is to ask whether households with greater access 
to community radio have greater knowledge of government policies relevant to literacy.  Prior 
research emphasizes the impact of media on government responsiveness through its effects on 
citizen knowledge (e.g., Besley and Burgess 2002; Strömberg 2004), but data limitations have 
prevented researchers from examining whether this is indeed the case.13  The Benin household 
                                                 




survey contains detailed questions that probe respondent knowledge of important national policy 
changes that are relevant to citizen efforts to hold governments accountable:  a massive program to 
hire new teachers; large increases in budgetary outlays to education; and more stringent requirements 
for students to pass the primary school leaving examination.  Consistent with the lack of impact of 
community radio on government inputs into village schools, reported in Table 6, access to 
community radio is not associated with greater knowledge of these policies, under any 
specification.14   
One explanation for lack of accountability effects might be that the variation in radio access 
is driven by access to out of commune radio stations which may not carry information relevant for 
local, commune-level, accountability. To check an immediate implication of such an explanation, we 
examined whether within-commune radio had a different correlation with school inputs, teacher 
presence, PTA activity, and policy knowledge, than did out-of-commune radio. We find no 
difference. 
Even if the effects of media access do not operate through the accountability channel, they 
still may influence household behavior.  Households exposed to more programming on the 
importance of educating their children might invest more time and money in the education of their 
children.  In countries such as Pakistan, tests of this channel are complicated by the proliferation of 
private education options.  Public schools are the only educational option for most households in 
our sample.  Only 2 villages in the sample report having no functional public school, and 44 percent 
have more than 1 public school. Private schools exist in only 7 percent of the sampled villages, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
voter knowledge about their legislators. 




only 1.6 percent of household respondents report enrolling any of their school-age children in 
private schools.  
The household survey reports two financial investments that households make in education.  
The focus here is on a variable constructed from the household roster:  the number of children in 
the household attending school for whom the household purchases books.  Approximately 42 
percent of households with children in school report buying books.  The reporting is likely to be 
accurate, since the number of children for which households buy books is significantly negatively 
correlated with the number of children in schools where government-supplied books are available; 
the majority of children are in schools where books are not available.   
The household roster also records the number of children for whom the household paid 
matriculation fees for a child in school.  However, two factors weaken the likely effects of radio 
access on these payments. First, education programming may increase household demand for better 
educational outcomes for their children (increasing the likelihood of payments), but in the case of 
the USAID programming described earlier, may also increase household confidence in the quality of 
schools and reduce the value they place on private payments to teachers.  Second, in contrast to the 
book-buying information, responses to this question appear to exhibit substantial measurement 
error.  The survey asks, ―Do parents in your area continue to pay fees to schools?‖  Of the 
respondents who indicate that they have paid fees for their children, though, 63 percent report that 
parents in their area are not paying fees.  In addition, income and wealth variables that are associated 
with book-buying are not associated with fee payment.   
Table 7 reports the effects of radio access on households‘ education investments.  The base 
regression is: 




where the units of observation are household i in village j and commune k. The number of school-
aged children for whom the household buys books and the number of children for whom the 
household reports paying fees are the dependent variables.  The control variables include commune 
fixed effects; the number of children in the household; the number of adults, including adults over 
60; a number of ethnic and religion dummies; a variety of measures of household income (quality of 
housing construction, cash income levels reported by the household and ownership of mobile 
phones or a television); the marital status of the household head (including single or polygamous), 
the gender and age of both the respondent and household head, and the number of textbooks in the 
village primary school.  We assume that standard errors are independent at the commune level, not 
at the village level, and report robust standard errors, clustered at the village level.  Results are 
actually stronger when standard errors are clustered at the commune level.   
The previous arguments for the exogeneity of village access to community radio stations 
extends to households.  First, households with children in school and more radio access are 
essentially indistinguishable from those with less radio access.  With few exceptions, controlling for 
commune fixed effects, access to community radios is not significantly associated with any 
observable attributes (most ethnicities and religions, income and wealth variables, etc.).  One 
exception is that Peulh households exhibit significantly greater access, but the magnitude of the 
relationship is small.  The age of the head of household also differed significantly across households 
with more and less radio access, but again the effect is small:  a one standard deviation increase in 
the age of the head of the household (14 years) is associated with a reduction in the number of radio 
stations by .05.  Female-headed and Dendi households also had less access to community radio, 
though these effects are not quite significant (p=.12 and .15, respectively), and are also small.  
Results are robust to excluding Peulh and Dendi respondents,  the oldest 25 percent of household 




Second, household mobility is low; there is little risk that households with more interest in 
education move into areas where community radio is more prevalent.  Third, and most importantly, 
the main endogeneity concern is not that motivated families move to jurisdictions with better radio 
programs about education.  It is rather that they move to jurisdictions with better schools.  
However, the results in Table 6 indicate that there are no measurable differences in school inputs in 
villages with greater and less access to community radio, including differences that are known to 
have a significant impact on student learning, such as student-teacher ratios and teacher 
absenteeism. 
The first column in Table 7 shows the results of the regression of community radio access 
on the number of children in school for which a household buys books.  This is really the share of 
children for which it buys books, since the regression controls for the number of children.  One 
additional community radio increases the number of children for which the household buys books 
by .08; though the effect is not large, it is statistically significant and supportive of the behavioral 
channel of community radio influence.  Column 2 reports results that restrict the sample to 
households that are indistinguishable on all observables, focusing only on households with 
respondents and household heads younger than 50, non-Peulh and non-Dendi households, and 
households headed by males.  Though this sample is much smaller than in Column 1, the results are 




Table 7:  Effect of Listening to Community Radio on Household Education Investments  





Dendi, HHs w/older 
or female heads, 
older respondents  





IV for HH listening: 
Radio access 
Community radio stations 





  0.03 
(0.24) 
 
Household listens to at 
least one community radio 
station (IVs:  radio access ) 
    1.84 
(0.04) 
  .84 
(0.09) 
Private commercial stations 





  -0.06 
(0.13) 
 
































































































Observations  2,165  1,276  2,165  2,165  2,165 
R
2  0.27  0.29    0.10   
Hansen‘s J-statistic (p-value), F-
statistic 
    .92, 10.2    .68, 5.12 
First stage results (Same for both IV regressions; robust p-values in parentheses) 
Community radio stations received by village (#)  .03  (.02) 
 
Commercial stations    -.06  (.003)   
Religious stations    .06  (.08)   
Public stations    .03  (.30)   
F-statistic on excluded instruments    3.3   
Note:  ―Household listens to community radio‖ instrumented with access to community stations, commercial stations, 
religious stations, public stations.  Robust p-values, clustered at the village level, reported in parentheses.  All 
specifications include controls for commune fixed effects.  Other controls (all are either never or rarely significant) are 
not reported:  access to public or religious radio stations; age and gender of household respondent and of household 
head; eight different ethnic dummy variables; whether respondent is Islamic or Catholic; number of adults in household 
and number of household members older than 60; whether head of household is polygamous; whether respondent is 




Since the household survey contains information on which radio stations households listen 
to, it is possible to ask directly whether listening to stations that broadcast education programming 
influences household investment decisions.  This is yet another link in the causal chain from radio 
access to education outcomes.  Of households with children in school, 67 percent listen to 
community radio.  Though this ratio is almost precisely the same (66 percent) for households that 
do not have children in school, it is nevertheless possible that the decision to listen to community 
radio is potentially endogenous to unobserved household characteristics that influence education 
investment.   To address this possibility, radio access can be used as an instrument for listening 
behavior, assuming that radio access is exogenous to households and influences education 
investments only through its effect on household listening behavior.   
The third column in Table 7 therefore asks whether households that report listening to at 
least one community radio station, using access to community, private commercial, public and 
religious radio stations as instruments for station preference.  All types of stations are used as 
instruments since the decision to listen to any one type of station is dependent on the availability of 
other kinds.  As the lower rows of Table 7 demonstrate, station access has a significant effect on 
whether households listen to community radio; the F-statistic associated with the instruments 
implies that the probability that the instruments do not add explanatory power to the first-stage 
regression is less than two percent.  Evidence from the Hansen‘s J-statistic (with a p-value of .92) is 
also supportive of the exclusion restriction:  the effect of access variables on book-buying is only 
through household listening behavior.  Using these instruments to control for the endogeneity of 
listening behavior, then, the estimated effects of listening to community radio are large:  households 
that listen to community radio purchase of books for 1.8 additional children.   
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 7 display the results for fee payments reported by 




radio access on school fee payments.  Households pay fees for a larger share of children in villages 
with greater radio access.  Because of noisy responses to this question, the effect is not significant.  
However, when household listenership is instrumented with radio access, the effects on fee 
payments are large and significant:  households that listen to community radio pay informal school 
fees for one additional child.    
The results in this section are notable in demonstrating for the first time the channels 
through which media access operate.  First, we document that a particular kind of media access, 
community radio, is strongly associated with greater village exposure to information about education 
and health.  Second, access to this information does not increase government accountability:  it is 
associated neither with greater government inputs into local schools nor with greater knowledge 
about government policies that affect those inputs.  Third, though, media does increase household 
investments in education.  Moreover, after isolating the exogenous component of household 
listening behavior explained by radio access, households that listen more to community radio also 
invest more in their children‘s education.   
8.  Conclusion 
The analysis here contributes to the fast-growing literature on the role of media and 
information in influencing household behaviors and government accountability.  We use unique data 
from Benin to shed light on several issues that, because of data limitations, were beyond the reach of 
earlier research.  First, the results demonstrate for the first time a substantial effect of media access 
on education performance:  the literacy scores of eight and nine year-olds are significantly higher in 
villages with greater access to community radio.   
Second, the data permit the channels through which media access matters to be separately 
investigated.  Prior research has not been able to document whether media actually broadcast 




broadcasts a significant quantity of education-related information, both absolutely and relative to 
other broadcasters.  However, access to community radio does not influence education outcomes 
through greater collective demand for better government performance.  Government inputs into 
village schools, and household knowledge of government policies related to education, are all 
unrelated to village access to community radio.  Instead, greater access to community radio leads to 
significantly more private investment by households in the education of their children.  Among 
households with children, those that listen to more community radio because of their access to a 
larger number of community radio stations are more likely to buy books and to make informal or 
private tuition payments to schools.   
Community radio has unique attributes that enable it to provide information that influences 
household decision making with regard to education.  On the one hand, these broadcasters, unlike 
the national radio station, are established to cater to the local audience.  On the other hand, the 
scarcity of commercial advertising means that these radio stations have to sell their broadcasting 
time to ministries and donors interested in disseminating public interest programming, particularly 
on education and health.  Because they play programming that people like, people are more likely to 
hear this public interest programming.  Because stations cannot turn to commercial advertisers for 
financial support, they are more likely to broadcast this type of programming.   
The effects of community radio that we document have three important policy implications.  
First, media interventions intended to promote better service delivery by improving government 
responsiveness should take into account the broader conditions in political markets and whether 
they promote political incentives to provide quality public services.  Lack of policy information per se 
may not be the main impediment to citizen collective action needed to hold governments 




Second, radio markets such as Benin‘s, dependent on donor and government purchases of 
programming slots, may be particularly inhospitable to accountability-based programming.  Stations 
that depend on government programming (or on programming by donors who are in turn 
concerned about relations with government) are less likely to broadcast programs that question 
government performance in education or other areas.  The data from Benin are unique in identifying 
the extent of education programming in radio broadcasts, but are insufficient to establish the 
programming balance between government education performance and the desirability of household 
investments in education.  This remains an important topic for future research.  
Third, even in the absence of an accountability channel, media interventions can have an 
effect on service delivery outcomes through their influence on household incentives to optimize 
their use of public services.  However, the particular type of programming that can have these 
effects may not emerge everywhere.  It is the product of media markets in which media providers 
want to broadcast the information and households want to listen to it.  The radio market in northern 
Benin provides such a setting, but other markets may not.   
In particular, a market in which commercial radio, dependent on traditional commercial 
advertising, is more firmly entrenched, may be less hospitable to extensive public interest 
programming.  Airtime is more expensive, raising the cost of information interventions.  Stations 
may regard informative programming as harmful to a franchise that depends on pure entertainment 
programming to attract advertisers.  In contrast, commercial stations may regard ―accountability‖ 
programming, which may have ―sensational‖ news characteristics, as more attractive. The degree to 
which this may enable commercial radio to deliver accountability effects, through their greater 
independence from government and ability to package accountability programming in entertaining 
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